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    arties to armed conflicts frequently deploy cyber weapons and, recogniz-
ing the competitive advantages afforded by autonomy, States are develop-
ing—or perhaps have already developed—autonomous cyber weapons for 
use in armed conflict.1 In this context, autonomy does not mean independ-
ence from humans because ultimately autonomous cyber weapons (ACWs) 
are programmed, deployed and can be supervised by humans.2 
As a matter of fact, autonomy exists on a continuum3 and the degree of 
autonomy possessed by a weapon is determined by its technical specification, 
the functions that have been automated, and the weapon’s interaction with 
a human agent.4 For example, cyber weapons have limited autonomy where 
                                                                                                                      
1. UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, THE WEAPONIZA-
TION OF INCREASINGLY AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGIES: AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYS-
TEMS AND CYBER OPERATIONS (2017), https://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/auton-
omous-weapon-systems-and-cyber-operations-en-690.pdf; Dan Sabbagh, Britain has Offen-
sive Cyberwar Capability, Top General Admits, GUARDIAN, Sept. 25, 2020, https://www.the 
guardian.com/technology/2020/sep/25/britain-has-offensive-cyberwar-capability-top-
general-admits. 
2. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TASK FORCE REPORT: 
THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS 1–2 (2012), https://fas.org/irp/agency/ 
dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf (“It should be made clear that all autonomous systems are super-
vised by human operators at some level, and autonomous systems’ software embodies the 
designed limits on the actions and decisions delegated to the computer.”). 
3. See U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon 
Systems, (2012, incorporating Change 1, May 8, 2017), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/ 
54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf. Moreover, according to the U.K. Min-
istry of Defence, 
An autonomous system is capable of understanding higher-level intent and direction. From 
this understanding and its perception of its environment, such a system is able to take ap-
propriate action to bring about a desired state. It is capable of deciding a course of action, 
from a number of alternatives, without depending on human oversight and control, alt-
hough these may still be present. Although the overall activity of an autonomous unmanned 
aircraft will be predictable, individual actions may not be. 
DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE CENTRE, UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF 
DEFENCE, JDP 0-30.2, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 13 (2017), https://assets.publish-
ing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/673940/ 
doctrine_uk_uas_jdp_0_30_2.pdf; see also DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE 
CENTRE, UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JCN 2/17, FUTURE OF COMMAND 
AND CONTROL (2017), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys-
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/643245/concepts_uk_future_c2_jcn_2_17.pdf. 
4. The human-machine interaction in the decision-making loop is schematically de-











they are controlled by pre-established algorithms, and conduct targeting op-
erations according to predetermined scenarios, or when they are authorized 
or supervised by humans. At the other end of the continuum, cyber weapons 
are highly autonomous where they utilize adaptive intelligence and self-learn-
ing capabilities in their efforts to identify and engage targets in complex and 
dynamic environments and when there is no communication with a human 
agent once launched. Highly autonomous cyber weapons are thus self-gov-
erning. Although they operate within a framework of planned behavior, they 
are able to make independent decisions in response to external variables and 
by interacting with the external environment and these decisions are made 
on the basis of internal programming, information, processes, conditions, 
and constraints. 
Stuxnet is a good example of such a weapon, even if it was not deployed 
during an armed conflict.5 Stuxnet was a computer worm that was surrepti-
tiously downloaded (probably through a compromised USB stick) onto the 
Intranet at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran and it was designed to frustrate 
Iran’s efforts to enrich uranium and develop nuclear energy. Operating 
within a complex web of interconnected networks, Stuxnet was able to iden-
tify specific models of programmable logic controllers (PLCs) manufactured 
by Siemens. These PLCs allowed the facility’s computers to control the cen-
trifuges used to enrich uranium. Stuxnet altered the PLCs’ programming, 
which caused the centrifuges to spin too quickly and for too long. These 
changes prevented the enrichment of uranium and caused the physical de-
struction of a large number of centrifuges. To remain undetected, Stuxnet 
recorded sensor values during the period in which the PLCs were operating 
normally. Once enough data had been collected, Stuxnet modified the PLCs’ 
programming while at the same time feeding computer operators fake sensor 
values, leading them to believe that the PLCs were functioning normally. An 
interesting feature of the Stuxnet virus was that, once deployed, it could not 
                                                                                                                      
Current autonomous weapons have varying degrees of autonomy. See, e.g., Alan L. Schuller, 
At The Crossroads of Control: The Intersection of Artificial Intelligence in Autonomous Weapon Systems 
with International Humanitarian Law, 8 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 379 (2017); 
PAUL SCHARRE & MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS (2015), https://www.cnas.org/pub-
lications/reports/an-introduction-to-autonomy-in-weapon-systems. 
5. For an overview of Stuxnet, see MARCO DE FALCO, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER 
DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, STUXNET FACTS REPORT: A TECHNICAL AND STRA-












interact with its operators since, for security purposes, Natanz is an air-
gapped facility insofar as it is not connected to the wider Internet. 
When ACWs engage in operations that produce “acts of violence against 
the adversary,” they qualify as “attacks” and must comply with the rules of 
international humanitarian law (IHL).6 Grave or serious breaches of IHL 
constitute war crimes.7 The question that immediately arises, and which will 
be considered in this article, is whether commanders can be held criminally 
liable for such crimes. 
Commanders can be held criminally liable as perpetrators if they use an 
ACW to commit the actus reus of a crime with intent or knowledge.8 For 
example, if a commander individually or jointly with others launches an 
ACW in order to kill protected civilians or is aware that such killings will 
occur in the ordinary course of events, they will be held responsible as per-
petrators or co-perpetrators of the war crime of intentionally directing at-
tacks against a civilian population.9 Commanders also can be held criminally 
liable as perpetrators if they commit a war crime through another person; 
when, for example, they control the will of a person who goes on to commit 
a war crime by using ACWs.10 Moreover, commanders can be held criminally 
liable as accomplices if they intentionally or with knowledge assist in the 
commission of a war crime by another person through the use of ACWs.11 
All this may be possible when ACWs are used in clearly defined and well-
structured operational environments against pre-planned and stable targets. 
However, where an ACW is deployed into a complex and evolving opera-
tional environment and has the capacity to make dynamic targeting deci-
sions, it cannot be said that the commander intended the commission of a 
                                                                                                                      
6. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 49(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
8. Id. art. 25(3)(a) (“Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with an-
other or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally re-
sponsible.”); see also id. art 30. 
9. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(i). 
10. Id. art. 25(3)(a) (addressing the perpetration of a crime through another person). 











war crime, that he or she had knowledge that it would occur, or that he or 
she assisted in its commission.12 
In view of the above, in this article we consider an alternative form of 
liability attached by international criminal law to military commanders, 
namely, command responsibility.13 Command responsibility is an indirect 
mode of liability that holds commanders criminally liable for their failure to 
prevent or repress crimes committed by their subordinates.14 
In order to apply the law of command responsibility to ACWs, it is im-
portant to explain how we envisage the relationship between a commander 
and an ACW. This is because command responsibility is grounded on a hu-
man-to-human relationship, that is, the relationship between commanders 
and their subordinates (soldiers). This construction of command responsi-
bility can certainly apply when, for example, soldiers commit war crimes by 
using ACWs and the commander fails to prevent their commission or fails 
to repress them. 
However, our focus in this article is different: it is on the relationship 
between a commander and an ACW. We submit that the relationship be-
tween a commander and an ACW resembles and replicates the relationship 
between commanders and their soldiers. This is because ACWs are agents 
that operate within an organized system of command and control even if 
they act on their own when executing an order or have self-learning and 
adaptive capabilities. This system of command and control comprises re-
sources (human and material), structures, facilities, processes (for example, 
training) and legal and military authority according to which commanders 
                                                                                                                      
12. This is particularly so since dolus eventualis (recklessness) has not been included 
within the ICC’s mens rea requirements. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-
2842, Judgment, ¶ 1011 (Mar. 14, 2012). 
13. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 28. 
14. These crimes include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime 
of aggression. It should be noted that command responsibility can run in parallel with direct 
forms of responsibility. According to existing jurisprudence, if both direct responsibility and 
command responsibility are established in relation to the same conduct, the former takes 
precedence and the position of the accused as commander is considered to be an aggravating 
circumstance when sentencing. See Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 91–92 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004); 
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 81 (May 
23, 2005); Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-











can exercise, maintain and actualize their command.15 It allows commanders 
to manage resources; collect and assess information; plan operations; make 
decisions; direct and execute operations; supervise, monitor and assess op-
erations, behaviors and actions; and take corrective action. It also ensures 
that operations are accomplished according to their objectives and within 
the law in circumstances of operational uncertainty, imperfect information 
and time-constraints. Operating within such a command and control system 
also means that the decision-making capacity and independence of subordi-
nates is bounded and conditioned, albeit in different respects and to different 
degrees. It is because of the existence of this command and control system 
that ACWs can be considered subordinates. The relationship between com-
manders and ACWs is thus analogous to that of commanders and soldiers 
because soldiers operate within an organized system of command and con-
trol and are considered subordinates even if they are able to make independ-
ent decisions.16 
It is also important to note that in both cases (soldiers and ACWs) com-
manders exercise macro-level command and control to ensure that their sub-
ordinates operate within the law and within their command as well as micro-
level command and control to effectuate their command in particular cir-
cumstances or in relation to particular subordinates.17 The two levels are in-
terconnected, interdependent and integrated within the concept of com-
mand and control and it must be viewed holistically. To explain, while micro-
command requires the application of the command and control tools to spe-
cific instances and persons, it can be exercised only if the framework of 
macro-level command and control is in place and functioning effectively. 
That said, the difference between exercising command and control over sol-
diers and ACWs lies in the fact that in the latter case command and control 
                                                                                                                      
15. See FRANK M. SNYDER, COMMAND AND CONTROL: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 
(1993); Loren D. Diedrichsen, Command and Control: Operational Requirements and System Imple-
mentation, 5 INFORMATION AND SECURITY 23 (2000); U.S. MARINE CORPS, MCDP 6, THE 
NATURE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL 33–60 (1996), https://www.marines.mil/Portals/ 
1/Publications/MCDP%206%20Command%20and%20Control.pdf. 
16. See Jens David Ohlin, The Combatant’s Stance: Autonomous Weapons on the Battlefield, 92 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1 (2016); Gary S. Corn, Autonomous Weapons Systems: Manag-
ing the Inevitability of ‘Taking the Man Out of the Loop’, in AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS: 
LAW, ETHICS, POLICY 209 (Nehal Bhuta, Susanne Beck, Robin Geiβ, Hin-Yan Liu & Claus 
Kreβ eds., 2016). 
17. Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 79–100 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2005) (noting that the trial chamber speaks of a 











is exercised, maintained and achieved through technical means whereas in 
the case of soldiers it is achieved through interpersonal, physical, or institu-
tional means. 
Having explained the relationship between commanders and ACWs, we 
will now apply the law of command responsibility to this relationship. The 
article proceeds as follows. Part II introduces the doctrine of command re-
sponsibility and identifies its core elements, namely, the existence of a supe-
rior-subordinate relationship; the commission or prospective commission of 
crimes by subordinates; and the commander’s knowledge or constructive 
knowledge of such crimes. Parts III through VII examine how these ele-
ments apply to ACWs, including a discussion of the scope of the element of 
causality introduced by Article 28 of the Rome Statute as well as the scope 
of responsibility of successor commanders. Part VIII concludes. 
 
II. THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
The principle of command responsibility is well established in military doc-
trine and international criminal law.18 It derives from the principle of respon-
sible command,19 according to which the commander, as the placeholder for 
the State, becomes the “guarantor” of IHL. For this reason, he or she is 
                                                                                                                      
18. See Prosecutor v. Mucić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 333 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Mucić, Judgment]; 1 CUSTOM-
ARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 153, at 558–63 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & 
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005); see generally Mijan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command 
Responsibility, 49 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 455 (2001); Kai Ambos, Su-
perior Responsibility, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY 823 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002); GUÉ-
NAËL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY (2009); CHANTAL MELONI, 
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2010), Nicholas Tsagou-
rias, Command Responsibility and the Principle of Individual Criminal Responsibility: A Critical Analysis 
of International Jurisprudence, in PROTECTING HUMANITY: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND POLICY IN HONOUR OF NAVANETHEM PILLAY 817 (Chile Eboe-Osuji ed., 2010); 1 
KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 197–232 (2013); THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1056–1106 (Otto 
Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 3d ed. 2016). 
19. See Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1(1), an-
nexed to Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; Additional Protocol I, supra note 6, arts. 86–87; see also 
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CON-
VENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶¶ 3549–50 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno 











entrusted with powers to foster and ensure compliance with IHL. Im-
portantly, a commander’s dereliction of this duty attracts sanctions, including 
criminal ones.20 
As an international criminal law principle, command responsibility was 
developed by war crimes tribunals, particularly after World War II.21 It was 
later codified in the statutes of international criminal tribunals—specifically, 
Article 7(3) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia (ICTY)22 and Article 6(3) of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),23 which contributed to the develop-
ment of the doctrine. It has also been codified in Article 28 of the Rome 
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC).24 
The three main constitutive elements of command responsibility as for-
mulated in Article 28 of the Rome Statute are: 
 
(i) The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; 
(ii) The superior knew or should have known that international crimes 
were about to be committed or had been committed by subordi-
nates; and 
(iii) The commander failed to take the necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent or repress the commission of the crimes or 
to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation 
and prosecution.25 
 
Article 28 also requires a causal nexus between the crimes and the com-
mander’s failure to exercise proper command. 
How these elements apply to ACWs will be explored in the Parts that 
follow but, before this discussion, we need to explain the nature of command 
                                                                                                                      
20. Halilović, supra note 17, ¶¶ 39, 87; Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08, Judg-
ment, ¶ 172 (Mar. 21, 2016) [hereinafter Bemba, Judgment]. 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Yamashita, 4 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
1 (1948); United States v. von Leeb et al. (The High Command Case), 11 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL 
LAW NO. 10, at 542–45 (1950). 
22. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia art. 7(3), 
S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993), adopting the Secretary-General Report Pursuant to Paragraph 
2 of Security Council Resolution 808. 
23. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6(3), S.C. Res. 955 
annex, (Nov. 8, 1994), reprinted in 33 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1598 (1994). 
24. In its modern formulation, command responsibility encompasses both military and 
civilian superiors but this article focuses exclusively on military commanders. 











responsibility26 because this will have a bearing on the interpretation of its 
elements. 
Article 28 of the Rome Statute casts command responsibility as a mode 
of liability for the crimes of subordinates when it states that commanders are 
responsible “for” the crimes of their subordinates.27 By contrast, the ad hoc 
tribunals treat command responsibility as responsibility for the dereliction of 
an affirmative duty to prevent or repress crimes committed by subordinates. 
As the ICTY trial chamber opined in Halilović: 
 
The Trial Chamber finds that under Article 7(3) command responsibility is 
responsibility for an omission. The commander is responsible for the fail-
ure to perform an act required by international law. This omission is cul-
pable because international law imposes an affirmative duty on superiors 
to prevent and punish crimes committed by their subordinates. Thus “for 
the acts of his subordinates” as generally referred to in the jurisprudence 
of the Tribunal does not mean that the commander shares the same re-
sponsibility as the subordinates who committed the crimes, but rather that 
because of the crimes committed by his subordinates, the commander 
should bear responsibility for his failure to act. The imposition of respon-
sibility upon a commander for breach of his duty is to be weighed against 
the crimes of his subordinates; a commander is responsible not as though 
he had committed the crime himself, but his responsibility is considered in 
proportion to the gravity of the offences committed.28 
 
In our opinion, this is a better approach because it comports with the 
principle of culpability in that commanders bear responsibility for their own 
                                                                                                                      
26. See Ambos, Superior Responsibility, supra note 18; GERHARD WERLE & FLORIAN JESS-
BERGER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 221–22 (2014); Chantal Meloni, 
Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of Subordinates or Separate Offence of the 
Superior?, 5 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 619 (2007); Darryl Robinson, 
How Command Responsibility Got So Complicated: A Culpability Contradiction, Its Obfuscation, and a 
Simple Solution, 13 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2012). On how com-
mand responsibility applies to cyber war, see TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS r. 85, at 396–400 (Michael N. Schmitt 
ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. 
27. Bemba, Judgment, supra note 20, ¶ 171. Contra Ambos, Superior Responsibility, supra 
note 18, at 851. 
28. Halilović, supra note 17, ¶ 54; Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No. 
IT-01-47-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 74–75 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2006) 
[hereinafter Hadžihasanović, Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, 












culpable omissions concerning their subordinates’ crimes rather than being 
criminally liable for these crimes themselves. Further, to treat command re-
sponsibility as a form of participation in the crimes of others undermines 
Article 25 of the Rome Statute or makes Article 28 irrelevant.29 This ap-
proach also comports with the rationale of command responsibility which, 
as explained earlier, makes commanders guarantors of legality during an 
armed conflict, due not only to their powers, but also to the special relation-
ship that exists between commanders and subordinates. 
 
III. THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPERIOR-SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP 
 
The first constitutive element of command responsibility is that of a supe-
rior-subordinate relationship which, in effect, refers to a command and con-
trol relationship.30 This relationship can be de jure or de facto. The former 
refers to a commander’s vested authority over subordinates,31 with the mili-
tary service being the primary institution operating under a formal command 
and control. Yet, a command and control relationship does not need to be 
formal. It can also arise from factual or other subordination circumstances, 
mainly due to a person’s de facto authority and powers of control.32 In this 
case, one can speak of a de facto commander.33 However, the most decisive 
                                                                                                                      
29. Halilović, supra note 17, ¶ 78. Although command responsibility is often referred to 
as a sui generis mode of liability, see Bemba, Judgment, supra note 20, ¶ 174, it is not always 
clear to what this refers. But, according to van Sliedregt, command responsibility combines 
aspects of mode liability and aspects of separate offense liability. See ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT, 
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 196 (2012). 
30. Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 521 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005) (citation omitted) 
The superior-subordinate relationship lies at the heart of the doctrine of a commander’s 
liability for crimes committed by [his or] her subordinates. It is the position of command 
over and the power to control the acts of the perpetrator which forms the legal basis for 
the superior’s duty to act and for his [or her] corollary liability for a failure to do so. 
31. Command has been defined as “[t]he authority that a commander in the armed 
forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment,” whereas com-
mand and control has been defined as “[t]he exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 40 (June 
2020), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf. 
32. Limaj, supra note 30, ¶ 522. 
33. Command responsibility can thus extend to non-military superiors effectively acting 
as military commanders. See Prosecutor v. Mucić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 195 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001) [here-











factor is the commander’s “effective command and control or authority and 
control” over subordinates.34 This suggests a “real” or “actual power to con-
trol,”35 which in the case of command responsibility refers to “the material 
ability to prevent or punish criminal conduct.”36 Put differently, effective 
control refers to the capacity of commanders to effectuate their command 
over subordinates in general or in particular circumstances. Whether this ca-
pacity exists in the particular circumstances is a matter of evidence and is 
assessed on a case-by-case basis, whereas the existence of de jure command 
only creates a rebuttable presumption of effective control.37 That said, what 
the law requires is for the commander to have a functional command and 
control system.38 
                                                                                                                      
1A-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 35 (July 3, 2002); Bemba, Judgment, supra note 20, ¶¶ 
176–77. This distinguishes them from civilian superiors as defined in Article 28(b) of the 
Rome Statute. 
34. Bemba, Judgment, supra note 20, ¶ 189. The requirement of effective command and 
control is explicitly stated in Article 29 of the Law Establishing the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea ch. VIII, art. 29, as amended by NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 
2004) [hereinafter Law on the Establishment of the ECCC]. Although “command” and 
“authority” are deemed to refer to the same thing, one can say that “command” relates to 
de jure and “authority” to de facto commanders; see also Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-
01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the 
Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶¶ 412–13 (June 15, 2009) 
[hereinafter Bemba, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b)]. 
35. Bemba, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b), supra note 34, ¶ 418; see also 
Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 422 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001); Prosecutor v. Mucić et al., Case No. IT-96-
21-T, Judgment, ¶ 370 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); Mucić, 
Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 33, ¶ 256. “Effective control” for the purposes of 
command responsibility does not have the same meaning as in the law of State responsibil-
ity, which is about the State’s effective control over a wrongful act. See G.A. Res. 56/83, 
annex, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 8 (Jan. 28, 2002). It is 
also different from the notion of control over the crime or over the will of the perpetrator, 
which is required for co-perpetration or for perpetration through another person according 
to the Rome Statute. Instead, effective control in the law of command responsibility is con-
trol over subordinates. Limaj, supra note 30, ¶ 522. 
36. Limaj, supra note 30, ¶ 522; see also Bemba, Judgment, supra note 20, ¶ 183. 
37. Mucić, Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 33, ¶ 197; Hadžihasanović, Judg-
ment, supra note 28, ¶¶ 845–46. 
38. It is important to stress that ad hoc command and control in relation to a particular 











In Bemba, the ICC trial chamber noted a number of factors drawn from 
existing jurisprudence that may indicate the existence of effective command 
and control. These factors include: 
 
(i) the official position of commanders within military structures and 
the actual tasks they carried out; 
(ii) the power of the commander to issue orders, including his capacity 
to order forces or units under his command, whether under his 
immediate command or at lower levels, to engage in hostilities; 
(iii) the capacity to ensure compliance with orders, including consider-
ation of whether the orders were actually followed; 
(iv) the capacity to re-subordinate units or make changes to command 
structure; 
(v) the power to promote, replace, remove, or discipline any member 
of the forces, and to initiate investigations; 
(vi) the authority to send forces to locations where hostilities take 
place and withdraw them at any given moment; 
(vii) independent access to, and control over, the means to wage war, 
such as communication equipment and weapons; 
(viii) control over finances; 
(ix) the capacity to represent the forces in negotiations or interact with 
external bodies or individuals on behalf of the group; and 
(x) whether the individual represents the ideology of the movement 
to which the subordinates adhere and has a certain level of profile, 
manifested through public appearances and statements.39 
 
By contrast, the trial chamber explained that a lack of effective command 
and control can be indicated by a number of factors, namely: 
 
(i) the existence of a different exclusive authority over the forces in 
question; 
(ii) disregard or non-compliance with orders or instructions of the ac-
cused; 
(iii) a weak or malfunctioning chain of command; and 
(iv) the existence of intermediaries that prevent a commander from 
exercising effective command and control over subordinates.40 
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It transpires that most of the aforementioned factors apply to ACWs 
which, as we said, operate within a system of command and control. In prin-
ciple, a commander can issue orders to an ACW, direct or modify its opera-
tions, and supervise and monitor it to ensure compliance with IHL. A com-
mander can also replace the weapons or withdraw them from the field.41 
Whether these powers amount to effective control depends on the weapon’s 
programming, how it is designed to operate, and the extent to which its ac-
tivities can be supervised and overridden by the commander. For example, 
algorithms may govern the activities of cyber weapons, restricting their at-
tack capability to specific targets within certain networks and for a limited 
period. They can also strictly limit a weapon’s area of operation or require it 
to comply with clearly defined rules of engagement. All these design and 
programming choices make its operation more deterministic and predictable. 
Furthermore, ACWs may remain under the close supervision of a com-
mander through a constant and real-time monitoring mechanism that allows 
him or her to adjust the algorithm to modify instructions, assign new tasks, 
or correct glitches. A commander may also have the ability to abort opera-
tions or deactivate a cyber weapon if it starts to behave unexpectedly or once 
it has successfully completed its mission. Under such circumstances, it is fair 
to conclude that the ACW acts under the effective command and control of 
the commander. 
ACWs can, however, be driven by powerful algorithms that enable them 
to determine which targets to engage, when they should be engaged, how 
they should be engaged, whether the target has been neutralized or should 
be re-engaged, and when to proceed to the next task. Highly autonomous 
cyber weapons can make these decisions very quickly and relay back to the 
commander vast quantities of complex data,42 all of which may effectively 
deprive a commander of his or her ability to supervise the weapon’s activities 
or intervene when problems occur. Also, and as with the Stuxnet virus, 
ACWs may be deployed into private or secure networks, in which case the 
commander is unable to communicate with them. In such cases, the degree 
of effectiveness of a commander’s control over ACWs can be questioned 
and needs to be proven on a case by case basis. It should also be remembered 
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in this respect that the commander’s duty to control is continuous and does 
not cease with the order or fielding of the weapon even if the ACW has been 
programmed appropriately. 
The above scenario is different from where a subordinate disregards the 
orders or instructions of a commander. According to the ICC trial chamber 
in Bemba, the latter scenario describes a situation where effective control is 
lacking due to disobedience. When however an ACW acts differently than 
instructed, it is not because it refuses to follow orders or disregards orders, 
but because it executes the order differently due to the fact that it processes 
the information differently. In short, the order is still executed within the 
parameters of command and control. Even if a question arises regarding the 
commander’s effective control over the weapon’s processing function when 
crimes are committed, the circumstances and reasoning are different from 
those involved in a scenario of disobedience. 
Disobedience is also different from a situation where an ACW selects 
and engages targets even if not specifically instructed by the commander but 
being consistent with the commander’s instructions regarding the type of 
targets to be engaged and the circumstances under which they should be 
engaged. In this case, the targeting decisions by the ACW fall within the 
commander’s framework of command and control but, depending on the 
circumstances, questions may arise about the degree of effective control over 
the ACW. 
A scenario where effective control would be lacking is the case of a rogue 
AWC, that is, an ACW acting on its own initiative in order to pursue a goal 
outside of the framework of command.43 In this instance, its actions fall out-
side of the commander’s command and effective control and command re-
sponsibility cannot arise. 
The role of intermediaries when determining the effectiveness of com-
mand and control was highlighted in the Bemba judgment,44 and it is a critical 
issue when it comes to ACWs. One can say that programmers are interme-
diaries because they code ACWs prior to their deployment and will often 
need to update the weapons while they are operational. However, whether 
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or to what extent they interrupt the effectiveness of command and control 
depends largely on whether they are integrated into the chain of command. 
If they are integrated into the chain of command, the programmer’s role 
is to support and enhance the commander’s ability to exercise effective com-
mand and control by making ACWs operational and enabling the com-
mander to be kept informed of their activities and to adjust them accord-
ingly. It would require an exceptional set of circumstances for a program-
mers’ input to be sufficiently substantial to interrupt the commander’s effec-
tive command and control over an ACW. Similarly, it would be most unlikely 
that programmers who form part of the chain of command are able to exer-
cise effective control over an ACW for the purpose of command responsi-
bility because they do not plan the operation or, more specifically, they do 
not decide when the weapon will be deployed; which targets will be attacked 
and with what level of priority; what the weapon’s overall objectives are; or 
when the weapon should be withdrawn. As international courts have con-
sistently held, the exertion of mere influence—no matter how strong—does 
not equate to effective command and control.45 It can thus be said that pro-
grammers integrated within the chain of command and operating in con-
formity with it do not interrupt its effectiveness. Integrating programmers 
into an effective command and control system may also be preferable. Oth-
erwise, programming mistakes can reverberate to the command and control 
level and increase the risk of crimes being committed. 
Programmers outside the chain of command can be treated as com-
manders themselves under certain circumstances. As we said, the law of 
command responsibility recognizes de facto authority and control. Moreo-
ver, effective command (or authority) and control does not mean exclusive 
command (or authority) and control.46 In fact, the law of command respon-
sibility recognizes parallel and multiple command structures in which re-
sponsibility is apportioned according to the level of control each person ex-
ercised at the relevant time. Thus, if a programmer controls how ACWs op-
erate by feeding the system with predetermined operational scenarios, 
whereas the commander controls when and how these weapons are em-
ployed in the particular operation and relies without questioning on how the 
weapon has been programmed, it can be said that both exercise effective 
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command (or authority) and control over the weapon and can be held re-
sponsible under command responsibility providing the other requirements 
are met. 
Such a situation would only arise in very exceptional circumstances when 
there is joint command and control by the operation commander and the 
programmer who makes the final programming decisions. It would not ex-
tend to manufacturers, developers, those responsible for authorising these 
weapons for military use or the programmers down the chain of program-
ming. These individuals may be held accountable under different provisions 
or under domestic law, for example, under tort law but not under command 
responsibility because no effective command and control relationship as de-
scribed previously exists between them and the weapon and no link exists 
with the particular crimes committed by the subordinates, which as we will 
explain below must be linked to how that command has been exercised. 
 
IV. THE COMMANDER “KNEW” OR “SHOULD HAVE KNOWN” 
 
According to Article 28(a)(i) of the Rome Statute, the commander must “ei-
ther knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known 
that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes.”47 
Knowledge primarily refers to actual knowledge established through di-
rect or circumstantial evidence. Indices of knowledge include the number, 
type, and scope of illegal acts committed; the time during which they oc-
curred; the number and type of troops involved; the logistics involved; the 
geographical location of the acts; their widespread occurrence; the tactical 
tempo of operations; the modus operandi of similar illegal acts; the officers 
and staff involved; and the location of the commander at that time.48 Where 
knowledge is inferred, it must be the only reasonable inference even if it is 
not necessary to demonstrate that a commander knew about the specific 
crimes. 
Consider a scenario where an ACW provides a commander with real-
time reports on its activities and, in particular, informs the commander of 
which targets it has selected before it engages them. Where the cyber weapon 
proceeds to attack a civilian network, it can be reasonably inferred from the 
circumstances that the commander knew that a crime was about to be com-
mitted. By contrast, knowledge cannot be inferred where the ACW’s reports 
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are incomplete, unintelligible, or unmanageable because of the size and com-
plexity of the data being fed-back. Moreover, it may be the case that an ACW 
is able to select and engage a target incredibly quickly, perhaps in a matter of 
nanoseconds. Even if the ACW issues a report to the commander prior to 
targeting, the speed at which the target is actually engaged may make it diffi-
cult to conclude that the commander must have known that a crime was 
about to be committed. However, if the ACW reports back to the com-
mander after the target has been engaged and it transpires that crimes have 
been committed, it can be said that the commander is aware that crimes have 
occurred. 
Article 28 of the Rome Statute diverges from the ad hoc tribunals in 
relation to the second head of mens rea. According to the jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc tribunals, the commander must have “had reason to know” that 
the criminal act was about to be committed or had been committed, which 
means that some general “information was available to him which would 
have put him on notice of offences committed by subordinates.”49 Article 28 
instead introduces a “should have known” standard that goes beyond the 
existence of notice and “requires more of an active duty on the part of the 
superior to take the necessary measures to secure knowledge of the conduct 
of his troops and to inquire, regardless of the availability of information at 
the time on the commission of the crime.”50 Consequently, a superior can be 
deemed “negligent in failing to acquire knowledge of his subordinates’ illegal 
conduct.”51 It transpires from this that Article 28 introduces a mens rea of 
negligence by holding commanders responsible where they fail to apprise 
themselves of the behavior of their subordinates.52 
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When employing ACWs, it is important to stress that commanders can-
not rely upon their lack of technological expertise to claim that they were 
not aware that crimes were about to be committed or had been committed.53 
The “should have known” standard envisages proactive commanders who 
familiarize themselves with their weapons’ capabilities and limitations, which 
is what responsible command requires. At the same time, the “should have 
known” standard requires commanders to scrutinize the information pre-
sented to them by ACWs rather than treat it as immediately reliable and ac-
tionable. This addresses the risk of automation bias but, more than that, it 
does not invert the relationship between a commander and an ACW and 
does not effectively abolish the role of the commander. 
Still, commanders are only expected to know what reasonable command-
ers should have known in their position.54 Thus, where a cyber weapon is 
highly autonomous and is capable of sensing, learning, and adapting to new 
environments, it may not be reasonable to expect commanders to know that 
the weapon is about to commit a crime because it would be unreasonable to 
expect them to have known all situational variables and all the different ways 
they can be processed. Likewise, where the weapon operates in a private 
network, it may be difficult for a commander to predict how the weapon will 
react to this unknown environment or to discover that a crime was commit-
ted. That said, reasonable commanders would not deploy a weapon in an 
environment where they have no control over it, cannot reliably predict how 
it will act, or have not tested it. 
A reasonable commander is also expected to keep up to date with the 
latest developments in technology. For example, imagine new software be-
comes available that enables an ACW to distinguish between military and 
civilian networks more accurately or to more precisely estimate the extent of 
collateral damage to civilian networks during an attack on military networks. 
Where commanders have this new technology available to them but fail to 
implement software upgrades, if a cyber weapon attacks civilian networks or 
causes excessive collateral damage, it could be said that a reasonable com-
mander should have known that the outdated cyber weapon was prone (or 
at least more likely) to engage in criminal acts. Alternatively, commanders 
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may give prior authorization for software updates to be installed automati-
cally. If this is the case, commanders must place limits on the types of up-
grades that can be automatically installed. In short, commanders must ensure 
that their authorization does not extend to updates that may compromise 
the weapon’s ability to comply with IHL. 
It may also transpire that an ACW has misdiagnosed a civilian network 
as a military network during a training exercise or when operating in the field. 
Technical reports may also surface that reveal the software used by the cyber 
weapon is defective. Similarly, media outlets or cyber security companies 
may independently report a weapon’s defects, erratic behavior, vulnerabili-
ties, or unauthorized conduct. Given that the information available to a com-
mander need not be specific and must be viewed as a whole,55 the com-
mander in these circumstances “should have known” that crimes had been 
or were about to be committed. 
We said above that under the “should have known” standard a com-
mander has a positive duty to seek information and to scrutinize infor-
mation, including that presented by the ACW. But what happens when, de-
spite this, the commander comes to the wrong conclusion and crimes are 
committed? If the commander’s assessment of the information was reason-
able under the circumstances, the commander is exculpated. While the 
“should have known” criterion may impose a proactive duty upon the com-
mander to inquire and find information, it is assessed on a case-by-case basis 
against material, temporal, and other related factors. 
 
V. THE DUTY TO PREVENT OR REPRESS 
 
Article 28 of the Rome Statute imposes three distinct duties on a com-
mander: to prevent the commission of crimes, to repress crimes, or to submit 
the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and, if necessary, 
prosecution.56 Existing jurisprudence, as developed mainly by the ad hoc tri-
bunals, instead imposes on commanders a duty to prevent or punish. The 
duty to repress included in Article 28 can include the duty to punish and the 
duty to submit the matter to a competent authority.57 For this reason, we will 
concentrate on the duty to prevent and the duty to repress. That said, it is 
important to make two points. The first point is that these duties should be 
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viewed on a continuum and as a spectrum of particular duties rather than as 
alternatives.58 The second point is that these duties are conditional; they are 
assessed against the criteria of necessity and reasonableness which, in turn, 
are assessed against the criterion of effective command and control.59 
Necessary measures are those that are appropriate for the commander 
to take to discharge the duty to prevent or repress crimes and reasonable 
measures are those that fall within the commander’s effective control.60 The 
necessity and reasonableness of the measures are also assessed against the 
scope of the underlying crimes, the reliability of the available evidence, and 
the limitations presented when a commander is located some distance from 
where the crimes occur.61 Moreover, whether the measures are necessary and 
reasonable does not necessarily depend on whether they were limited in 
“mandate, execution, and/or results.”62 Instead, they are dependent on 
whether any shortcomings were sufficiently serious, the commander was 
aware of them, it was materially possible to correct the deficiencies, and that 
they fell within the commander’s authority to remedy.63 
The duty to prevent spans the period from before the commission of 
crimes to their actual commission.64 It comports with the general obligation 
to ensure respect for IHL65 and the commander’s special position and pow-
ers as a steward of IHL. To fulfill this duty, a commander must ensure that 
“forces are adequately trained in IHL; secure reports that military actions 
were carried out in accordance with IHL; issue orders aimed at bringing the 
relevant practices into accord with IHL; [and] take disciplinary measures to 
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prevent the commission of atrocities by the troops under the superior’s com-
mand.”66 The commander must also: (i) issue orders specifically meant to 
prevent the crimes, as opposed to merely issuing routine orders; (ii) protest 
against or criticize criminal conduct; (iii) insist before a superior authority 
that immediate action be taken; (iv) postpone military operations; (v) sus-
pend, exclude, or redeploy violent subordinates; and (vi) conduct military 
operations in such a way as to lower the risk of specific crimes or to remove 
opportunities for their commission.67 
The above can very well apply to ACWs. First, a commander must take 
all reasonable steps to ensure that an ACW is programmed in such a way as 
to enable it to comply with IHL and with the objectives of the operation. 
This requires a commander to ensure, among other things, that the weapon 
has been tested and verified to operate as anticipated; is functional and reli-
able; is secure and protected from interference through anti-tamper mecha-
nisms; has the required connectivity; is supported by a robust and resilient 
communication and information exchange system; is subject to spatial and 
temporal limitations; operates a “capture first” command mechanism; can 
be programmed to recognize a list of protected targets; gives warnings before 
launching attacks; and is subject to real-time supervision. This does not mean 
that commanders must test every aspect of the cyber weapon for defects, a 
near-impossible task given how many lines of code are written into computer 
algorithms.68 Rather, commanders must take all necessary and reasonable 
measures to identify and resolve defects prior to deployment. 
Moreover, a commander must be trained to use the weapon and be aware 
of its operational capabilities and limitations, which means that the com-
mander must be able to respond to problems if they occur. Again, this does 
not mean that a commander must be able to predict every aspect of the 
weapon’s behavior, which would be extremely difficult in the context of an 
autonomous weapon operating in a virtual domain.69 Instead, what is re-
quired is that the commander has a sufficiently sound understanding of the 
weapon to be confident that its activities will conform to IHL and that he or 
she will be able to intervene if required. 
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Once deployed, if commanders become aware that ACWs are about to 
commit crimes, they must again take all necessary and reasonable measures 
to prevent that activity or repress it when it is ongoing. This may require the 
cyber weapon’s algorithm to be recoded or, where this would be insufficient 
to prevent the criminal acts, the commander would be expected to deactivate 
the weapon. Time is an important factor here because cyber weapons—es-
pecially when operating autonomously—can process information and make 
decisions very quickly. The upshot is that commanders may not have the 
time to prevent the cyber weapon from acting. In addition, a commander 
may not be able to interact with an ACW where it is operating in a closed 
network. Here, there is no opportunity for a commander to adjust, override, 
or deactivate the weapon if problems arise. In these circumstances, it may be 
necessary and reasonable for the commander to inform the opposing party 
that a cyber weapon is operating on one of its networks and at risk of engag-
ing in criminal behavior. 
The duty to repress arises during ongoing crimes and after the commis-
sion of crimes.70 It is also a broad duty; it can include criminal, disciplinary, 
or administrative measures or punishment, criminal prosecution, investiga-
tions, reporting to relevant authorities, or any other measure that can repress 
criminal activity. The ICC trial chamber in Bemba defined repress as to “put 
down,” “subdue,” “restrain,” and to “keep or hold back.”71 This definition 
is important when this duty applies to non-human agents where some of the 
aforementioned actions are not applicable. 
At a minimum, where an ACW commits a crime because of a design 
flaw, it is incumbent upon the commander to patch the defect, which may 
mean referring it to the programmer or military cyber command authorities 
for reassessment and reprogramming. If that is not possible or the defect 
cannot be corrected immediately, it would be necessary for the commander 
to remove the weapon from the field until it can be safely redeployed. 
An interesting question is whether a commander is under a duty to re-
press when an ACW has committed a crime while under a previous com-
mander’s command and control. This scenario may arise in the case of 
ACWs because, given the interconnected nature of cyberspace, they can pro-
duce reverberating effects, and any crimes they commit may not become 
known until after the attack has been completed and a full technical assess-
ment has been conducted. 
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This hypothetical raises the specter of successor command responsibil-
ity. The Nuremberg Military Tribunal,72 ad hoc tribunals,73 and the ICC74 
have rejected this possibility because they require the commission of crimes 
by subordinates to coincide with the commander’s exercise of command and 
control at the time the crimes were committed. It seems that existing juris-
prudence takes a formal and time-limited approach to command and control. 
The causal link between the crimes and the commander’s failure to exercise 
proper command required by Article 28 is another reason advocating against 
successor responsibility.75 
In our opinion, the acceptance of successor command responsibility 
rests on the nature and purpose of command responsibility.76 If command 
responsibility entails responsibility for subordinates’ crimes, a successor 
commander cannot be held responsible for failing to repress crimes commit-
ted on another commander’s watch. But as we argued in Part II, the better 
approach is to see command responsibility as responsibility for the derelic-
tion of duty and, if the purpose of command responsibility is to ensure com-
pliance with the law, a successor commander has a duty to repress past 
crimes. Thus, if a successor commander is aware that crimes have been com-
mitted by an ACW, he or she should reassess, reprogram, or decommission 
the weapon, or request others to do so. Otherwise, time-limiting the com-
mander’s duty undermines IHL and the aims of command responsibility. If 
the commander fails to do so and uses the same cyber weapon, this would 
amount to dereliction of the duty to prevent further crimes.77 And, if war 
crimes are indeed committed, he or she could be charged as a perpetrator or 
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accomplice since, as noted in Part II, command responsibility and individual 
criminal responsibility apply in parallel. 
An alternative situation where successor command responsibility can 
arise is when an ACW is deployed while under the effective command and 
control of a former commander but its violent effects are not felt until a later 
point because its activation is time-delayed, as would be the case with a logic 
bomb (a logic bomb is a piece of code that is surreptitiously inserted into 
computer software and a malicious function is triggered when specified con-
ditions are met). If a successor commander becomes aware of the weapon’s 
deployment and knows that, once activated, it will result in the commission 
of a crime, he or she should take all necessary and reasonable steps to prevent 
its activation. If the commander only becomes aware of the weapon after it 
has been activated and crimes have occurred, the duty to repress would be 




According to Article 28 of the Rome Statute, crimes must be committed “as 
a result” of the superior’s failure to exercise proper control.78 Article 28, 
therefore, seems to introduce causality into the doctrine of command re-
sponsibility in contrast to the ad hoc tribunals that have rejected causality.79 
Even if Article 28 requires causality, it does not provide much clarity as 
to its scope. For example, commanders cannot be said to “cause” subordi-
nates to commit crimes where they fail to repress80 or report the matter to a 
competent authority. This points to treating command responsibility as re-
sponsibility for dereliction of duty rather than as responsibility for participa-
tion in subordinates’ crimes. Causality may, however, be relevant in relation 
to the duty to prevent. But how can a commander’s failure cause a crime of 
intent, such as genocide, where the applicable mens rea is the “should have 
known” standard? 
Another difficulty concerns the required standard of causation. In Bemba, 
the ICC trial chamber said that the “but for” test is such a threshold but not 
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the only one.81 Other judges established a causal link because of the “high 
probability” that crimes would not have been committed had the com-
mander discharged his or her duty to prevent.82 By contrast, other judges 
dismissed the need for a causal link altogether.83 
In our view, if causation is an element of command responsibility, it is 
ingrained in the notion of effective command and control. This is because 
in order to establish the commander’s failure to exercise proper control, what 
needs to be established first is that the commander had effective command 
and control and, as we said previously, this includes the ability to prevent or 
repress. Consequently, the commander’s failure to fulfill his or her duty to 
prevent or repress when the material ability existed indicates a lack of proper 
control and links the commander to the underlying crime. Put differently, it 
is an objective causality proved by the commander’s failure to prevent or 
repress without needing to also prove why the failure to exercise proper con-
trol could cause the crimes.84 This approach is closer to the approach taken 
by the ad hoc tribunals and comports with what we said in the introduction 
that macro- and micro-command are interconnected, interdependent, and 
integrated, and therefore cannot be separated.85 It also comports with our 
approach to command responsibility as responsibility for dereliction of duty. 
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What this means in the case at hand is that if a commander detects, for ex-
ample, a code malfunction but fails to correct it, a causal link with any com-
mitted crimes is established because he or she did not exercise command 
properly by preventing the crimes. 
 
VII. CRIMES COMMITTED 
 
Under Article 28 of the Rome Statute, commanders are held criminally re-
sponsible under command responsibility for failing to prevent or repress the 
crimes committed by their subordinates. Therefore, it is important to explain 
what the term “crimes committed” means in the context of Article 28,86 and 
whether ACWs operating under a system of effective command and control 
can commit crimes. These questions interrelate and will be considered in 
tandem. It is important to stress however that this question is different from 
the question of whether subordinates can be held criminally responsible. 
Command responsibility is triggered when crimes are being committed or 
have been committed and not when subordinates are held criminally respon-
sible for these crimes. This is a crucial distinction to be made and it has im-
plications for ACWs to the extent that they cannot be held criminally re-
sponsible because they are not moral agents. 
One approach to the issue is to say that a crime is committed when both 
its actus reus and mens rea are present.87 An ACW can commit the actus reus 
of a crime, for instance, by directly targeting a civilian network. The imme-
diate question is whether they can have the requisite mens rea, which, as we 
noted, is intent or knowledge. Article 30(3) of the Rome Statute defines 
knowledge as an “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will 
occur in the ordinary course of events.”88 An ACW can be aware of a cir-
cumstance where it is sensed or recognized. Because ACWs are aware of 
their capabilities, they can also be aware of the consequences of their actions; 
for example, they can be aware that a target will be destroyed if an order is 
executed. Moreover, ACWs that possess self-learning capabilities can learn 
from experience or “trial and error” and use this information to enrich and 
adjust their knowledge and actions. It can thus be concluded that ACWs can 
have ingrained as well as acquired knowledge. 
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ACWs can also fulfill the mens rea of intent in relation to consequences, 
which Article 30(2)(b) of the Rome Statute defines as awareness that conse-
quences “will occur in the ordinary course of events.”89 Evidently, there is 
an overlap between the mens rea of intent and the mens rea of knowledge 
in relation to consequences. Regarding the required level of certainty, the 
ICC requires virtual certainty.90 Virtual certainty is not absolute certainty 
which does not exist even in human reasoning. Virtual certainty means that 
any uncertainty that lingers is non-consequential. It follows from this that, 
depending on how they are programmed to reduce uncertainty, ACWs can 
have virtual certainty. For instance, when they attack a particular target in 
order to destroy it, they are certain of the consequences because they have 
been pre-determined in their coding whereas if doubt has been coded, they 
can abstain from acting because they are able to recognize the resulting con-
sequences. 
According to another approach, to commit a crime means the commis-
sion of a proscribed act.91 A crime as a legally wrongful act92 can be decou-
pled from the notion of culpability (mens rea), which is about attributing the 
unlawful act to a moral agent due to their personal stance toward that act. 
What makes the act wrongful and legally proscribed is its harmful actus reus 
(with harm not necessarily being physical), rather than its attribution to a 
moral agent. It follows from this that the underlying crime for command 
responsibility purposes is an objective circumstance that is established where 
the actus reus—or aspects of the actus reus—that condition a crime are pre-
sent. According to this view, ACWs can fulfill the objective elements of a 
crime, for example, where they directly target civilian networks, a wrongful 
act in itself. 
In our opinion, this is a better approach and one supported by a number 
of other considerations. First, the commander does not need to know the 
specificities of the crimes or the perpetrators’ identities other than in general 
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terms as being his or her subordinates.93 Moreover, the obligation to prevent 
requires action before the commission of a crime while it is unfolding. Even 
when a commander suspects that a crime is about to be committed, he or 
she must intervene.94 Also, the obligation to repress includes a duty to inves-
tigate or institute criminal proceedings that will eventually establish the facts 
and possibly the culpability. This means that command responsibility can be 
activated even if not all the elements of a crime have been fulfilled; and of 
course, if individuals do not have to be identified, mens rea cannot be estab-
lished. Instead, what activates the commander’s duty to act in these circum-
stances is the existence of acts that condition the commission of a crime. 
Second, in order to enhance the effectiveness of command responsibil-
ity, international jurisprudence has not only applied it to all modes of perpe-
tration or participation included in Article 25 (3)(a)–(f) of the Rome Statute,95 
but to inchoate crimes as well. 
Third, command responsibility still attaches in situations involving ex-
culpatory circumstances. For example, where a subordinate engages in a 
wrongful act, for example, killing civilians, but does not have the requisite 
mens rea due to an exculpatory circumstance such as mental impairment, 
command responsibility will attach if the commander failed to prevent or 
repress the killing. This outcome can be contrasted with the case where the 
act’s wrongful character is removed because of a justification, for example, 
where a civilian is killed in self-defense. In this case, there is no wrongful act, 
and a commander cannot incur responsibility for his or her failure to prevent 
or repress what is a justifiable act. 
Fourth, and most importantly, this approach accords with the nature of 
command responsibility as responsibility for the dereliction of duty rather 
than responsibility for the crimes of subordinates and comports with its ra-





ACWs are likely to become a central feature of contemporary armed conflict. 
No technology is fail-safe and the question that arises is who can be held 
responsible if an ACW commits a war crime. This article has addressed this 
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question from the perspective of the doctrine of command responsibility by 
placing ACWs within a system of command and control. It then explained 
how its constituent elements, as they have been interpreted in international 
jurisprudence, apply to ACWs. A number of questions have been raised in 
this context. To what extent does the autonomous nature of cyber weapons 
preclude commanders from exercising effective command and control over 
them? What is the role of intermediaries such as programmers, and do they 
interfere with the effectiveness of a commander’s control over ACWs? Do 
successor commanders have command responsibility? 
As we move along the autonomy continuum, when can it be said that a 
reasonable commander knew or should have known that an ACW was about 
to commit or had committed a crime? What necessary and reasonable 
measures must commanders take to discharge their duty to prevent or re-
press? Can ACWs commit a crime for the purpose of command responsibil-
ity? 
In addressing these questions, it became clear that the law of command 
responsibility can apply to ACWs with the necessary adjustments and inter-
pretative refinement. However, this legal framework faces serious challenges 
as one moves toward the upper echelons of autonomy. As autonomous tech-
nology advances, it is essential to determine how it can be made compatible 
with legal principles and demands for accountability. We believe that being 
human-made technology there is an opportunity to develop autonomous 
technology responsibly and to align it with the principles and aims of hu-
manitarian law and international criminal law. In our view, the doctrine of 
command responsibility represents an important and powerful tool for en-
suring that international law remains in the loop when ACWs are used. 
 
